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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the extent to which foreign policy featured in the 2002 
general election campaign in the Republic of Ireland.  It began with the premise 
that although foreign policy had not featured prominently in previous elections 
campaigns the evolving crisis in the peace process in Northern Ireland, coupled 
with the ongoing debate over the Nice treaty may make foreign policy more likely 
to be part of the campaign debate and also the subject of party differentiation in 
2002.  The study reviewed party manifestos, press statements and other aspects 
of the media campaign. It found clear party differentiation in foreign policy 
between the parties in their manifestos, however the campaign in the national 
media was almost devoid of debate on these issues.  In analysing the reasons 
for the absence of debate, the dull and static nature of the campaign is 
contrasted with the surprising election results.  In concludes that although on the 
surface the absence of engagement on foreign policy in the media appears to 
concur with the dominant view in the literature that foreign policy in not significant 
in first order elections inferences can be made that leave the impact of foreign 
policy on voter behaviour a more open question. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The near consensus in the existing academic literature is that foreign policy 
issues play a small role in election campaigns and this reflects the elite driven 
nature of foreign policy formation itself.2  The aim of the research on which this 
article was based was to examine the role of foreign policy in the 2002 general 
election in the Republic of Ireland and to use the opportunity provided by the 
policy outlined in the manifestos to discuss party differences on foreign policy.  
                                             
1 We would like to acknowledge the work of Delma Campbell as research assistant on this 
project. 
2 See Joseph S. Nye jr., ‘The American national interest and global public goods’, International 
Affairs 78 (2) (2002), 233-45 for a good recent article on America in this area and John H. Aldrich, 
John L. Sullivan and Eugene Borgida, ‘Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential 
Candidates “Waltz Before a Blind Audience?”, American Political Science Review 83 (1) (1989), 
123-42 for an excellent introduction to the literature. 
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 Prior to the election campaign there were a number of key foreign policy issues 
which were the subject of public debate and appeared to be matters of concern 
to the voting public, notably Ireland’s relationship with the EU in the wake of the 
rejection of the Nice Treaty, the government’s fractious relationship with the 
European Commission on economic issues and the contentious decision to join 
Partnership for Peace.  In addition the peace process in Northern Ireland was 
drifting towards crisis and Sinn Féin the largest nationalist party in the Northern 
Ireland since 2001 was fielding candidates in the Southern election with the hope 
of making significant gains.  These factors seemed to indicate before the 
campaign that foreign policy issues would form the basis of party differentiation 
and competition and might be ones on which the opposition parties could attack 
the government.  Certain features of the 2002 election campaign particularly 
those relating to the campaign strategies of the main parties and the role of the 
media coupled with the, in some ways, surprising outcome made the relationship 
between foreign policy and domestic pressures more difficult to judge than had 
been expected but it also raised questions about the role of foreign policy in party 
competition more generally. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
 
The relationship between domestic pressures and foreign policy has been an 
almost perennial debate in the study of international relations and one where 
most scholars can agree that inter-connections exist, but it is the precise impact 
and the direction of causation that are disputed.  In the modern era James 
Rosenau sought to generate research leading to a better understanding of 
‘national-international linkages’3 and later Nye and Keohane4 brought this issue 
to the centre of the debate on international relations.  Robert Putnam’s (1988) 
conclusion still has resonance, when he said  
 
It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine 
international relations or the reverse.  The answer to that question is 
clearly ‘Both, sometimes’.  The more interesting questions are ‘When?’ 
and ‘How?’5
 
This exhortation has been followed by other writers. Steven Hook has argued 
that non-state actors both domestic and international are ‘increasingly potent’ in 
foreign policy adaptation and have ‘elevated the importance of state-society 
                                             
3 James Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems.  (New York, 1969). 
4 e.g. in Power and Interdependence  (Boston, 1977). 
5 Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games’, 
International Organisation 42 (3) (1988), 427-60: 427. 
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 relations’6 while US political science has in recent years sought to model the 
specific linkages between form of domestic politics and international action.7      
 
An important subset of this debate has been the extent to which election 
campaigns have been influenced by foreign policy questions – questions set by 
either the prevailing international climate or by strong voter preferences at the 
domestic level.  This literature has, to date, been dominated by American political 
science.  In the US, studies from the 1950s onwards tended to suggest that the 
US public had quite low levels of knowledge of foreign policy.8  While there have 
been countervailing arguments, both the ‘common sense’ perception and the 
majority of academic analyses suggest that despite the USA’s hegemonic status 
the domestic public is not strongly motivated by foreign policy issues.  Recently 
Joseph Nye argued that the American public paid little attention to international 
affairs and that foreign policy played a marginal role in the 2000 US elections.  In 
these circumstances according to Nye the ‘battle fields of foreign policy are left to 
those with special interests’.9   This emphasis in the literature has been 
challenged from within the US by authors such as Aldrich, who argues that 
political elites can mobilise voters using foreign policy agendas.10 Indeed it could 
be argued that this is precisely what the Clinton campaign did, with regard to 
Northern Ireland policy and Irish-American voters in the US presidential elections 
in 1992 and 1996.11 However, whatever the specifics of US elections and foreign 
policy, the question needs to be raised as to whether the dominance of US based 
research has given the international debate a bias which does not necessarily 
reflect Irish or indeed European experience.  
 
Nye’s analysis would appear to be supported by an analysis of the reports on 
general elections in western European democracies (11 in all), published in 
Electoral Studies from 1997 to 2002.  This indicates that while party positions on 
foreign policy are generally discussed by the authors, in particular divergent 
views on European integration and European Monetary Union, it is not viewed as 
being a significant campaign issue.  Dissension within political parties and 
sensitivity to post-election coalition arrangements were among the factors 
constraining parties from turning these differences into election issues.  
Exceptions were Norway, where the debate about European integration 
influenced the outcome of the 1997 election and Portugal also in 1997, when the 
crisis in East Timor coincided with an election campaign.  An ‘expert survey’ on 
policy positions of British political parties in 1997 demonstrated that although 
                                             
6 Steven W. Hook (ed.), Comparative Foreign Policy: adaptation strategies of the Great and 
Emerging Powers (New Jersey, 2002), 3. 
7 See Alastair Smith, ‘International Crisis and Domestic Politics’, American Political Science 
Review 92 (3) (1998), 623-38; Kenneth A. Schultz, ‘Domestic Opposition and Signalling in 
International Crisis’, American Political Science Review 92 (4) (1998), 82944. 
8 See Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950); James N. 
Rosenau (ed.) Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1961). 
9 Nye  ‘The American national interest and global public goods’: 233-4.   
10 Aldrich et al., 'Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting'. 
11 See Conor O'Cleary, The Greening of the White House (Dublin, 1996). 
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 policy on Europe is among the top two policy dimensions for every party, foreign 
policy was attributed a relatively low overall salience in elections by those 
surveyed.12 These finding could be interpreted as supporting the view that while 
foreign policy may be significant for parties it is not significant in elections or it 
could reflect academics own bias as a result of the development of consensus 
within the discipline.  Evidence from Switzerland suggests that when referenda 
on foreign policy issues are considered a different picture is presented.  Marquis 
and Sciarini look at four foreign policy referenda at the federal level between 
1981 and 1995 - on the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the European 
Economic Area and the creation of a Swiss UN peacekeeping corps - and 
compare them to the domestic policy votes.13  They found that voters were “well 
informed about and active in foreign policy” in contrast to the findings in the US 
literature.14   
 
To assess how expert opinion has analysed the role of foreign policy in general 
elections in the Republic of Ireland from 1987 the Annual Reviews of Foreign 
Policy in Irish Studies in International Affairs for the relevant years, the series of 
books How Ireland Voted 1987, 1989, 1992 and 1997, and the articles on each 
general election in Irish Political Studies from 1987 onwards, were surveyed.  In 
line with the survey of Electoral Studies the consistent feature of this literature is 
that foreign policy issues are described as a point of differentiation in the party 
programmes and manifestos, but rarely feature in the analysis of voter concerns 
or of party competition.  There was little discussion of the relationship between 
public opinion on foreign policy issues and voter behaviour or party strategies.  It 
has been assumed, rather than argued, that Irish parties do not use foreign 
policy as a campaign tactic and that even if Northern Ireland is occasionally 
raised, it is not important in explaining voter decisions.  (The question of whether 
Northern Ireland policy should be included in a study of ‘foreign policy’ is one of 
the unusual aspects of the Irish case.  Institutionally officials in both the Dept of 
An Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs work on the policy 
development and are engaged in negotiations. In deference to both nationalist 
and non-nationalist the foreign/domestic aspects of Northern Ireland policy have 
always been fudged.  For the purposes of this analysis it will be included as 
foreign policy rather than be consigned to the half way house of ‘Anglo-Irish’ 
relations.) 
 
The 1987 Irish general election is an instance where Northern Ireland policy was 
a feature of the election campaign arising from the clear divisions that existed on 
the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.  The significance of this debate has however 
been minimised by commentators.  Also in the background of this election were 
divisions on the Single European Act evident in the Dáil debate the previous 
                                             
12 Michael Laver,  ‘Party Policy in Britain 1997: Results from an Expert Survey’, Political Studies  
XLVI (2) (1998), 336-49. 
13 Lionel Marquis and Pascal Sciarini, ‘Opinion formation in foreign policy: the Swiss experience’, 
Electoral Studies 18 (1999): 453-71. 
14 Ibid: 467 
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 December and the on-going ‘Crotty’ Court challenge to the Government’s 
decision to seek to ratify the related Treaty without a referendum.15  Keatinge’s 
argues that “while quite a wide range of foreign policy issues were raised and 
there were some differences of emphasis between the parties, in general there 
was little attempt to move beyond simple assertions”.16  Likewise the analysis of 
party competition in the 1987 election by Peter Mair largely ignores foreign policy 
dimensions including European ones17 and Anglo-Irish relations only gets a brief 
mention in a section headed ‘traditionalism versus pluralism’ dealing with 
Northern Ireland, family law and religion. 
 
In the aftermath of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement most voters viewed the 
development positively and Fianna Fáil's opposition to it left them open to 
challenge.18  Initially, Charles Haughey refused to become involved in a debate 
on the Northern Ireland question, using the traditional argument that it should not 
be made an election issue.  Fine Gael was also constrained by having to avoid 
the accusation of playing party politics with a vital national interest, and indeed 
with people’s lives.  However, in the last ten days of the campaign, as Fine Gael 
lost ground in the polls, Fine Gael, the Labour Party and the Progressive 
Democrats simultaneously made an issue both of Fianna Fáil’s alleged ambiguity 
in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and of potential problems for Anglo-Irish 
relations that could be created if Charles Haughey were Taoiseach.19.  This 
attack appeared to successfully place Mr. Haughey on the defensive and Fianna 
Fáil at a disadvantage. In spite of this Girvin argues that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement does not appear to have been “salient” with voters.20  Likewise 
Keatinge argues that although the emergence of the northern issue coincided 
with an erosion of Fianna Fáil’s standing in opinion polls, and that while “policy 
may have been the currency of political debate…it does not seem to have been 
the deciding factor for most voters”.21   Keatinge states that other foreign policy 
questions were “virtually invisible” and concludes that the final result of the 
election seems to confirm the orthodox view of voters’ relative indifference to 
foreign policy.  This conclusion can be questioned. According to Laver 15% of 
the voters in a close run election that led to a minority government saw policy on 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement as ‘very important’ to them in an MRBI/Irish Times 
                                             
15 Patrick Keatinge, ‘Ireland’s Foreign Relations in 1987’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 2 
(4) (1988), 77-104: 81-85. 
16 Keatinge, ibid: 78-80. 
17 Peter Mair, ‘Policy Competition’ in Michael Laver, Peter Mair and Richard Sinnott (eds.) How 
Ireland Voted: the general election of 1987 (Dublin, 1987), 30-47. 
18 An MRBI poll conducted for the Irish Times in the week after the Agreement was signed saw 
59% approval for the Agreement but perhaps more importantly 43% of Fianna Fáil voters 
approved and only 52% of FF voters support the Haughey position.  Interestingly given Dick 
Spring’s prominent association with the Agreement, 22% of Labour voters supported Haughey 
stance.  Poll reproduced in Irish Political Studies 1 (1987), 144. 
19 Brian Girvin, ‘The Campaign’, in Michael Laver, Peter Mair and Richard Sinnott (eds.), How 
Ireland voted: the general election of 1987 (Dublin, 1989), 9-29. 
20 Girvin, ibid: 29. 
21 Patrick Keatinge,  ‘Ireland’s Foreign Relations in 1987’: 78-80. 
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 poll.22 While there was no exit poll to confirm the impact of the opposition's 
campaign tactic of attacking Fianna Fáil and Charles Haughey in particular on 
their Northern Ireland policy the progress of the opinion polls and the final 
outcome of the election suggests that it may have eroded Fianna Fáil support.  
 
There is no reference to foreign policy for the 1989 general election in Irish 
Political Studies, or in Farrell’s or Girvin’s chapters in How Ireland Voted 1989.23  
Marsh and Sinnott also in How Ireland Voted note that under 3% of voters saw 
issues related to Northern Ireland policy as important issues in the election 
campaign24 and despite the referendum on the Single European Act EU in May 
1987, issues or foreign policy did not feature at all.  A key feature appears to 
have been that in contrast to 1987 there was no determined effort by the larger 
parties to raise these issues.  Keatinge says “foreign policy issues barely 
featured” in the general election campaign though they were present in the party 
manifestos.25   Since the 1987 election Fianna Fáil has changed their position on 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement and had sought to use its provisions to seek further 
reform in Northern Ireland.  This had the effect of substantially removing this 
issue from the campaign.  In contrast to 1987, there was no perceived advantage 
to be gained by any of the parties in raising Northern Ireland as a prominent 
campaign issue and so it remained in the margins.  While Labour, the Workers 
Party and Sinn Féin raised neutrality the larger parties did not respond in a 
manner which allowed a debate.  A content analysis of campaign coverage in 
two national newspapers identifies fifteen issue categories, including a 
“miscellaneous” heading.  Foreign policy does not feature as an issue, but 
Northern Ireland does.  Coverage on the latter, measured in column centimetres, 
represented one per cent of total in the Irish Independent and four per cent of 
total in the Irish Times.26   
 
In the 1992 election Girvin noted that the main differences between the parties 
came “at the margin, on issues, such as Northern Ireland”27.  Different attitudes 
to the questions of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were evident, 
particularly between the former coalition partners, Fianna Fáil and the 
Progressive Democrats.  Fine Gael and the Democratic Left supported the 
                                             
22 Michael Laver,  ‘Issues, attitudes and party policy’, in Michael Laver, Peter Mair and Richard 
Sinnott (eds.), How Ireland voted: the general election of 1987 (Dublin, 1989), 113-26: p.117 
(based on MRBI/Irish Times poll. 
23 Pat Neville, ‘The 1989 general election in the Republic of Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 5, 
(1990), 69-76; Brian Girvin, ‘The Campaign’, 5-22 and David M. Farrell ‘Campaign Strategies and 
media coverage’, 23-43, both in  Michael Gallagher and Richard Sinnott (eds.), How Ireland 
Voted 1989 (Galway 1990). 
24 Michael March and Richard Sinnott, ‘How the Voters Decided’ in Michael Gallagher and 
Richard Sinnott (eds.) How Ireland Voted 1989 (Galway, 1990), 94-130: 108. 
25 Patrick Keatinge, ‘Annual Review: Ireland’s Foreign Relations in 1989’, Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 3 (2) (1990), 137-165: 138. 
26 David Farrell, ‘Campaign strategies and media coverage’, in Michael Gallagher and Richard 
Sinnott (eds.) How Ireland Voted 1989 (Galway, 1990), 23-43: 40. 
27 Brian Girvin, ‘The road to the election’  in Michael Gallagher and Laver, Michael (eds.),  How 
Ireland Voted 1992.  (Dublin, 1993), 1-20: 16. 
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 Progressive Democrats’ view that Fianna Fáil was guilty of a lack of generosity 
and flexibility in the negotiations.  Democratic Left went furthest in suggesting 
that the amendment of the article should be offered at an early rather than a late 
stage in any future talks.  In an MRBI poll taken just after Albert Reynolds 
became Taoiseach in 1992 80% of respondents identified Northern Ireland as a 
priority for his Government (compared to 99% for unemployment and 70% for the 
EU).28   However debate on Northern Ireland during the campaign never reached 
the levels of 1987, as neither the political parties or the media sought to make it 
an issue. 
 
According to Rees in the 1997 general election, “Irish foreign policy and Ireland’s 
overseas interests were not pressing electoral issues in the run up to the June 
election”.29 An analysis of the 1997 Irish party manifestos by the Manifesto 
Research Group, cited by Garry and Mansergh places external relations among 
three low priority domains, at an average 6.3 percent of content.  There was 
however significant variation within the individual parties, with the Green Party at 
11.2 per cent and Fine Gael at 2.6 per cent.  Much of the foreign policy content 
related to the EU, with the Greens and the Progressive Democrats emphasising 
negative rather than positive aspects of the EU.  The Greens, Democratic Left 
and Labour devoted 2 percent to positive mentions of internationalism, a 
category that encompassed issues such as aid for the developing world and 
support for the UN.30   The issue of European security and neutrality featured in 
most manifestos.  Partnership for Peace (PfP) was regarded positively by the 
Labour Party, Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats.   Fine Gael suggested 
a referendum would be required.  The Progressive Democrats advocated closer 
military co-operation with European partners, while Sinn Féin, Democratic Left, 
Fianna Fáil and the Greens opposed membership of the PfP.  Despite the clear 
policy divergences there was very little focus on these issues in the party 
campaigns.  
 
Northern Ireland featured significantly in the election for the first time since 1987.  
Opinion polls early in the year had signalled this - presumably due to the ongoing 
peace process - between 10% and 11% of all voters thought Northern Ireland 
would be the main issue in the forthcoming election.31   Murphy notes that 
Northern Ireland was one of a number of points of contention between the 
potential Fianna-Fail-Progressive Democrat coalition.32  The day before the Dáil 
was dissolved, Bertie Ahern met the Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams, and 
indicated his belief that the British and Irish governments should meet Sinn Féin 
                                             
28 Cited in Michael Marsh and Richard Sinnott,  ‘The Voters Stability and Change’ in Michael 
Gallagher and Michael Laver (eds.) How Ireland Voted 1992 (Dublin, 1993), 93-114: 99. 
29 Nicholas Rees ‘Ireland’s foreign relations in 1997’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 9 (1998), 
135-59:136. 
30 John Garry and Mansergh, Lucy, ‘Party Manifestos’ in Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell (eds.), 
How Ireland Voted 1997, (Oxford, 1999), 82-106. 
31 MRBI poll from the Irish Times, repeated in Irish Political Studies 13 (1998): 239-40. 
32 Gary Murphy, ‘The 1997 General Election in the Republic of Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 13 
(1998), 127-134: 128.  
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 before the IRA cease-fire was renewed.  Fine Gael and Labour opposed 
government-Sinn Féin contact without a cease-fire.  Democratic Left, the Greens 
and the Progressive democrats wanted a cease-fire as a precondition for Sinn 
Féin entry into talks. The Progressive Democrats stated that Mary Harney would 
not meet Adams, and nor should the governments.  The following day, however, 
“to much incredulity among commentators”, the Progressive Democrats denied 
that there was much difference between the parties.33  There was also 
disagreement between the parties in the outgoing government.  Before the British 
election of 1 May, the outgoing Taoiseach John Bruton had declared that a vote 
for Sinn Féin in advance of an IRA cease-fire would be a vote for violence.  In a 
speech in Derry on 26 May, Labour Tánaiste Dick Spring was reported as saying 
that the Sinn Féin vote in the election was a vote for peace.  Following a charge 
from the opposition that the government was sending out conflicting signals, the 
two claimed to be in agreement that Sinn Féin could turn its electoral mandate 
into a vote for peace.  Later in the campaign, this issue surfaced again, when 
Bertie Ahern attacked Bruton for his failure to give leadership to nationalist 
Ireland.  Gerry Adams also entered the fray and accused the Taoiseach of 
mismanaging the peace process.34  Marsh and Sinnott highlight the impact of 
Northern Ireland in the 1997 election in an analysis of opinion polls.  They found 
that ‘if a voter spontaneously mentioned Northern Ireland as a factor influencing 
his or her vote, he or she was substantially more likely to vote for Fianna Fáil in 
preference to any other party save Sinn Féin’.  The negative impact on the 
government parties (Fine Gael, Labour Democratic Left) was they say ‘quite 
substantial’.35  It seems that Fianna Fáil had successfully convinced the electoral 
that they rather than Fine Gael could best manage the peace process. 
 
The dominant view among Irish academics is that foreign policy issues (including 
Northern Ireland policy) are not significant factors in influencing voters’ decisions.  
Studies of election campaigns tend to either ignore foreign policy altogether; note 
that it is a issue of party differentiation but argue it is not one of significance for 
voters; or treat it as an issue of media interest which has little impact on the 
public.  A model of foreign policy based on elite independence and public 
indifference would seem to be re-enforced.  However there are indications that 
when in 1987 and 1997, parties chose to make Northern Ireland  a campaigning 
issue the clear divergence between the parties benefited Fine Gael in 1987 and 
Fianna Fáil in 1997.  In both cases the party with the perceived advantage used 
considerable resources to drive its advantage home.  Differences in party policy 
are clearly a necessary condition for this type of intervention but not sufficient.  In 
most elections there has been differences in party policy but in 1987 and 1997 
major political parties chose to make them a campaigning issue in their media 
work, advertising etc.  When parties made this decision to campaign actively 
there is prime facie evidence that the public did respond.  Certainly Northern 
                                             
33 Murphy, ibid: 128.   
34 Murphy, ibid: 130.   
35 Michael March and Richard Sinnott ‘The Behaviour of the Irish Voter’ in Michael Marsh and 
Paul Mitchell (eds.), How Ireland Voted 1997, (Oxford, 199) 151-80: 174. 
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 Ireland policy at least has had the capacity in some circumstances to influence 
voter behaviour.  Also by its nature focusing on election campaigns implies a 
focus on party competition – competition for the floating voter.  This does not 
preclude foreign policy being a key factor in party identification and the retention 
of core voters.   
 
 
THE 2002 ELECTION 
 
Manifestos 
 
A study of the foreign policy content of election manifestos needs to be grounded 
in a clear understanding of the current function of party manifestos in Ireland, in 
particular the long manifestos issued to the media, but not generally circulated, 
which were surveyed for this study.  These manifestos serve a number of 
purposes, they are amongst the most worked out statement of policy issued by 
the political parties and in this context they include policy commitments in areas 
that the party chooses not to highlight during an election campaign – some 
aspects of foreign policy may well fit into this category.  Foreign policy issues are 
included because they are part of the party’s self image; of concern to its core 
support or perhaps only to a small segment of that support; of importance as part 
of internal party coalition building or support building among interest groups.  In 
Ireland since the late 1980s manifestos have also played an increasing role as 
draft programmes for government, including in some cases a level of detail that is 
unlikely to be of interest to the general public.  As multi-party governments have 
become the norm since 1989 parties enter the election with the assumption, even 
hope, that they will need to negotiate a detailed programme for government in a 
very short period after the election result is known.  The Progressive Democrats 
as a policy driven party were perceived to have had a strong influence on the 
programme for government of the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats coalition 
1989-92, this influenced the Labour party strategy in 1992 when it produced an 
election manifesto with a view to developing a coalition programme for 
government, a negotiated position they were able to take into the 1994 Rainbow 
government.   For these reasons manifestos have significance beyond the 
immediate election campaign. 
 
It is not the intention of this section to give a detailed summary of the manifestos 
foreign policy coverage, it will rather highlight the relative importance given to 
foreign policy and discuss the purpose which engagement with foreign policy 
served for the parties.  Of the two government parties Fianna Fáil’s foreign policy 
was the most extensive and the most persuasive in the sense that they sounded 
like a party intending to govern.  The manifesto, A Lot Done More To Do, 
contained 86 pages of which 11 closely typed pages were devoted to foreign 
policy, the content of which was specific and detailed.  In comparison the 
Progressive Democrats' engagement with foreign policy including Anglo-Irish 
relations was perfunctory – surprisingly so given that Liz O Donnell has been a 
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 very effective minister of state in the Department of Foreign Affairs.  As the major 
opposition party, Fine Gael’s manifesto was disappointingly vague and compared 
to the Fianna Fáil manifesto relatively brief with only seven pages of well spaced 
print given to foreign policy.  Furthermore unlike Fianna Fáil who had highlighted 
Northern Ireland and other foreign policy issues in their introduction and 
summary sections Fine Gael gave these issues less prominence.   In the 
summary introduction to the manifesto by Michael Noonan there is no reference 
to Northern Ireland or Anglo-Irish relations.  There are however generalised 
references to ‘an Ireland that keeps its commitment within the rules of the EU … 
that champions the cause of countries less well-off than ourselves ... that stands 
up for our belief in a peaceful and just world order’. 
 
All of the left of centre parties used foreign policy to some extent to bolster their 
left wing or alternative credentials.  The Labour Party, in spite of being the largest 
in this bloc was the least energetic in this regard and did not really seek to 
distinguish itself from the conservative parties using foreign policy.  Their 
manifesto was primarily focused on their campaign pledges which were confined 
to domestic policy issues and it was released in stages so that the section on 
‘Ireland and the World’, released last and with no major media effort received 
little attention.   This section of the manifesto was not even referred to in the 
manifesto launch press release on Labour’s web-site.  The entire document had 
to be opened to learn of its existence.  Labour’s focus on its domestic policy 
pledges may have been motivated by a perceived necessity to lay the ground for 
post-election bargaining which it thought was inevitable with one of the two big 
parties.  In addition however, unlike the other left parties it had not opposed the 
Nice Treaty, so in competition with the Greens and Sinn Féin it would not have 
been strategic to draw undue attention to its support for a second referendum.   
Labour does however give support to the European Social Model and increased 
development aid and calls for a referendum on neutrality.   
 
Sinn Féin and the Green Party used their manifestos to detail their more radical 
policies and both parties devoted a good deal of space to these issues.  They 
both support increased development aid and in terms of EU policy oppose a 
second Nice referendum, ‘enhanced co-operation’, increased majority voting and 
the Rapid Reaction Force.  The Green Party manifesto not surprisingly highlights 
international action on environmental issues including Sellafield and Climate 
Change.  Sinn Féin, in spite of the difficulties which the arrest in Columbia of 
people associated with the party caused with its American support base, 
maintained its support for a number of radical causes in clear opposition to the 
US administration.  For example they call for the implementation of UN resolution 
242 in the Middle East, the ending of sanctions on Iraq and the US embargo on 
Cuba, the cancellation of third world debt and the introduction of the Tobin Tax. 
 
In their manifestos all parties cover Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations.  
Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin give it most prominence, with both parties clearly 
feeling that their respective roles in the peace process would be positively 
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 perceived by the electorate.  It was a very prominent part of the Fianna Fáil 
manifesto, reflecting their view of this as a ‘feel good’ story and also their 
determination to retain their nationalist credentials in the face of competition from 
Sinn Féin.  Fianna Fáil emphasised and set out detailed proposals on cross-
border co-operation.  Sinn Féin in turn called for a Green paper on Irish unity and 
for some form of northern representation in the Oireachtas.  In keeping with the 
low priority given to foreign affairs more generally the focus of the Progressive 
Democrats' Northern Ireland section contains an attack on Sinn Féin for its 
alleged lack of support for the Irish Defence Forces and for their failure to join the 
police board in Northern Ireland.  The Fine Gael manifesto while different in tone 
to the position adopted by John Bruton when party leader was still clearly 
distinguishable from Fianna Fáil’s.  There was little attention given to cross-
border co-operation and it emphasised British-Irish than North-South relations.  It 
highlights that ‘priority will be given to the decommissioning of all paramilitary 
arms’, and reaffirms the centrality of opposition to violence and the unionist 
guarantee. 
 
On Europe the key issues of party difference were attitudes to the Nice Treaty, 
neutrality and Ireland’s role in future European Security and Defence policy.  
Despite the government’s public row with the EU Commission on economic and 
tax policy36 the Fianna Fáil manifesto strongly supported the EU and European 
issues are given prominence.  The Progressive Democrats are also supportive of 
the EU but emphasise their insistence that fiscal and taxation decisions remain 
national and not European ones.  Fine Gael in the manifestos section on Europe 
unlike that on Northern Ireland engaged in strong criticism of the outgoing Fianna 
Fáil-Progressive Democrats government.  They attack the Government parties 
for destroying Ireland's positive image within the EU; by allowing Ministers to 
speak critically; by delays in implementing directives; and by poor Ministerial 
attendance at some Council meetings. Fine Gael also call for a debate on 
neutrality without setting out their own view, a failure to spell out the detail of their 
policy proposals that is repeated on other issues.    Crucially despite the critical 
tone the party did not choose to use this issue strongly in their media campaign 
and in debate with Fianna Fáil.  The Labour Party set out a series of Irish and EU 
level reforms highlighting increased transparency within Europe and oversight of 
EU measures in Ireland.  They will seek a EU declaration on neutrality, and try to 
enact legislation to limit Ireland’s participation in the European Rapid Reaction 
Force to ‘peace-keeping and peace enforcement missions which have UN 
legitimacy’.  They would finally seek to insert a prohibition on Ireland entering a 
mutual defence pact into the constitution no later than the date of a second 
referendum on Nice which they believe should be held.  Finally as stated above 
the Greens and Sinn Féin's policy positions on the EU oppose the current 
direction of EU integration and in particular oppose the Rapid Reaction Force 
and a second referendum on Nice.   
 
                                             
36 See Irish Times, 12 February 2001. 
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 There is therefore clear party differentiation on the EU.  Fine Gael is the most 
strongly pro-EU in its rhetoric and criticises Fianna Fáil for being too negative.  
Fianna Fáil's manifesto is however very positive on European integration and 
enlargement and there is no hint of the earlier clashes between McCreevy and 
the EU Commission or the euro sceptical comments from leading members of 
Fianna Fáil.37  The Progressive Democrats are positive but assertive on low 
taxation and fiscal autonomy.  Labour are positive while emphasising the need 
for reforms on the democratic deficit and clarification on neutrality.  The Greens 
and Sinn Féin while supportive of enlargement are clearly opposed to the Nice 
Treaty, to any security or defence policy and to the current institutional reforms. 
 
There was a series of other issues raised in the manifestos.  Fianna Fáil and 
Labour had sections on Defence, all parties had commitments to at least 0.7% of 
GNP being spent on official development aid.  Fine Gael criticises the campaign 
to secure election to the UN Security Council as being 'expensive and time 
wasting'.  The Greens and Labour highlight the need to review industries in 
Ireland making equipment for the arms trade.  Sinn Féin also mention UN reform 
and Third World debt.  However none of these issue was consistently mentioned 
by all the parties in a manner which enables comparisons.  Of the ‘stand alone' 
issues only ‘Sellafield’ featured in the media campaign.   
 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES 
 
Apart from party manifestos it is possible to make some judgements as to the 
relative priority given to foreign policy issues by the campaign fought by each of 
the parties.  However parties do not campaign in a vacuum.  Small parties have 
only a limited capacity to set agendas and where media coverage and time is 
proportional can find themselves squeezed out even of the debates initiated by 
the larger parties.  Larger parties can also find it difficult to generate debate in the 
media if none of the other parties choose to compete with them on that particular 
issue and the media can influence party responses by what activities and topics it 
chooses to cover.  
 
A survey of all archived press releases on the web-sites of the political parties 
from May 1st to the election day of May 17th indicated a lower priority for foreign 
policy than was evident in the manifesto coverage.38  Of a total of 88 press 
releases from Fianna Fáil, four related to foreign policy issues, one was on 
Sellafield, and three on Northern Ireland, including one policy document.  Fine 
Gael’s site hosted 124 press releases of which seven related to foreign policy: 
two on Sellafield, one on the Middle-East crisis, one on Northern Ireland and 
three on Europe.  Of 88 press releases from the Labour party, just one related to 
                                             
37 For example those by Minister Síle DeValera,  Irish Times 19th September 2000. 
38 Archived Press releases were available for all of the parties only for the last three-weeks of the 
campaign, it was decided for the sake of comparability to use this shorter period rather than the 
full election campaign. 
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 foreign policy on the issue of Sellafield and there was no media campaign on the 
foreign policy section of their manifesto.  Sinn Féin’s web-site archived a total of 
66 press releases, of which four had a foreign policy content, of these, three 
related to Northern Ireland and one to Sellafield.  The Green Party site had nine 
releases in the period under review, none of which was related to foreign 
policy.39  The Progressive Democrats' web-site held 62 press releases, of which 
one was foreign policy related, on the question of Europe.40  Overall therefore 
foreign policy issues, including Northern Ireland made up only a small proportion 
of what the parties chose to release to the media in formal press releases in the 
final three weeks of the campaign but some of the parties did seek to use other 
high profile tactics to mobilise support especially on Northern Ireland and to a 
lesser extent on Europe. 
 
NI as a campaign issue 
Fianna Fáil clearly sought to promote their involvement in the peace process to 
maximum effect.  Their pre-election billboard advertising focused on the 
economy and the Good Friday Agreement in roughly equal proportions.  Their 
manifesto strongly highlighted their role in the peace process. “Peace Prosperity 
Progress” was one of two slogans used on their election posters and leaflets.  
Bertie Ahern’s opening comments on the TV debate with Michael Noonan41 and 
his final speech of the campaign focused heavily indeed almost exclusively on 
Northern Ireland.  It is clear that Fianna Fáil believed that their approach to the 
peace process had gained them a crucial advantage with floating voters 
compared to Fine Gael.  Fianna Fáil hoped to benefit from the peace process in 
2002 as they had done in 1997, using their role in the signing of the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement as a ‘feel good’ factor in their campaign and seeking to portray 
themselves as better placed to consolidate the Agreement than their electoral 
rivals.  Fianna Fáil saw Sinn Féin as a much more significant electoral threat than 
they had been previously especially in key constituencies.  A high profile on 
Northern Ireland and a strong commitment to North-South links was probably 
designed to hold (and attract) more nationalist minded voters. 
 
In this election, unlike 1997, Fine Gael managed to prevent Northern Ireland 
becoming a topic of debate in the campaign.  Michael Noonan in his campaign 
for the Fine Gael leadership had promised to bring Fine Gael back to the 
nationalist centre and move away from what many within Fine Gael perceived to 
be the unpopular stance taken by John Bruton.42  This was supported by other 
leading members of the party.  At their party conference in February 2002 Deputy 
                                             
39 The Green Party had issued a press release on Sellafield on April 19. 
40 In fact the same statement, by Michael McDowell,  was issued twice (13 and 15 May) under the 
respective titles of “Why is nobody mentioning Europe?”, and “Election will decide Ireland’s 
interest in Europe”.  Available from http://www.progressivedemocrats.ie, accessed on 03/05/02. 
41 RTE One television 9.30pm on 14th May 2002 
42 Bruton had as Fine Gael leader consistently argued that the role of the Irish Government was 
to be equidistant between northern nationalists and unionists rather that part of the nationalist 
consensus at the heart of the peace process.  He repeated this view after the election, Irish 
Times, 21  May 2002. 
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 Leader Jim Mitchell referred to the party’s ‘undiluted commitment to peace and 
reconciliation in our quest for national unity, which remains our first policy 
objective’.  Party spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Jimmy Deenihan said Fine 
Gael was an ‘unashamedly nationalist party’.  The party however did not seek to 
campaign on this issue because of Fianna Fáil’s perceived advantage in this 
area.  It simply wished to close the debate and deny Fianna Fáil the chance of 
making electoral capital.  Therefore the differences in the manifestos were not 
used in the campaign debates to attack Fianna Fáil.  Instead Michael Noonan 
made a virtue of restraint and in a statement, referred to a long-standing Fine 
Gael practice, whether in government or opposition, of making only one 
statement on Northern Ireland during general election campaigns.  He went on to 
say that while the electorate is entitled to know where Fine Gael stands, it is also 
important “that we do not complicate an already difficult situation by introducing it 
as an element in party politics in this jurisdiction”.43  While Fine Gael chose to 
intervene much more forcefully on Northern Ireland in 1987 and again in 1997, in 
2002 they clearly saw that a debate on Northern Ireland would serve to benefit 
Fianna Fáil and sought to prevent Fianna Fáil making it a point of policy 
difference between the parties.   It is interesting to note that in the Ahern-Noonan 
television debate of May 14th the four minutes out of seventy which were 
dedicated to Northern Ireland were remarkable for their consensual tone.44  It 
was the one exchange of the evening where Noonan made no attempt to counter 
Ahern or to critique Fianna Fáil policy. 
 
The Labour Party also chose not to raise Northern Ireland as part of its election 
campaign.  The party had made a number of attacks on Sinn Féin, on Northern 
Ireland policy loosely defined, in the run up to the election, most strikingly on the 
Adams-Quinn television debate on the Late Late Show when Ruairí Quinn tried 
to minimise the Sinn Féin leader’s role in the peace process.45  These attacks 
continued until mid April46 but were not a feature of the national Labour Party 
campaign after that date.  It must be assumed that the Labour Party, like Fine 
Gael, felt that raising the issue and engaging in debate with Sinn Féin would be 
counter-productive, more likely to rebound in Sinn Féin’s favour.  Michael 
McDowell of the Progressive Democrats also attacked Sinn Féin on the issue of 
their alleged lack of support for the Gardai and Defence Forces.  While this form 
of attack on Sinn Féin featured to some extent in the pre-campaign debates, 
once Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams made a statement explicitly recognising 
the Defence Forces and the Gardai as the legitimate military and police forces of 
the state it ceased to be a significant issue.  The Green Party made no significant 
interventions on Northern Ireland or Anglo-Irish relations. 
 
                                             
43 Michael Noonan.  Fine Gael, Statement on Northern Ireland, 12 May 2002.  Available from: 
http://www.finegael.ie, accessed on 03/05/02/ 
44 Tonight with Vincent Browne, RTE, May 14. 
45 Report of show in Irish Times, 17 November 2001. 
46 e.g. statement from Ruairí Quinn, 19th April 2002 on Labour website.   Mark Hennessy of the 
Irish Times notes a similar change of tone in Kerry North, Irish Times 4th May 2002. 
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 Sinn Féin in their campaign literature explicitly asked for an endorsement of their 
role in the peace process.  The language of their speeches and leaflets was 
seeking support to continue and strengthened the process and was not an 
explicit attack on the policies of other parties.  In their overall campaign strategy 
they seem to have taken the view that they had already mobilised that section of 
the population who were going to vote for them primarily on the basis of the 
national question.  They, therefore, sought to use the opportunity of the election 
to broaden their appeal and highlight their commitment to social justice and 
equality issues.  Their campaign slogan ‘Building an Ireland of Equals”, while 
capable of including equality in Northern Ireland and the concept of a united 
Ireland also directly focused on issues of poverty and social exclusion.  At their 
campaign launch, while they highlighted the peace process (and the Nice Treaty) 
they particularly focused on the widening gap between rich and poor that had 
developed under the previous Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael led governments and 
sought to present the party as unmistakably to the left on economic policy.47   
 
Despite the best efforts of Fianna Fáil Northern Ireland did not feature as a 
significant issue in the actual campaign primarily because Fine Gael did not 
compete for support on this basis.  Sinn Féin as a small party could not make the 
North and election issue even if it had chosen to.  What is noticeable is that the 
other parties did not choose to attack Sinn Féin on its Northern Ireland policy in a 
concerted way during the campaign.  The strongest criticism of Sinn Féin, based 
on denying its legitimacy as a political party, had taken place prior to the 
campaign proper. 
 
Europe 
The defeat of the EU ‘Nice’ Treaty referendum might have set the stage for a 
significant debate on the future of Europe or even on the Treaty itself in the 
general election.  However no such debate took place.  In this case it was the 
anti-Nice parties Sinn Féin and the Greens which sought to put the question of a 
second referendum, neutrality and European security and the wider issue of the 
future of the EU, on the agenda for debate.  However apart from manifesto 
commitments to a second referendum in the autumn the pro-Nice parties would 
not enter this debate during the election campaign.  The Irish Times editorialised 
the day before polling saying it was a ‘great paradox’ that the Nice Treaty was 
not discussed during the campaign.  On that day they also carried two separate 
articles on Nice and an opinion poll.  They did not reflect however on their own 
role in shaping the election coverage.  Similarly the Kerryman newspaper, 
without self-reflection, editorialised on the absence of ‘key political issues’, 
including the Nice Treaty from the election debate.   
 
Interventions by the pro-Nice parties were limited.  John Bruton hosted one press 
conference for Fine Gael.  He accused Fianna Fáil and the Progressive 
Democrats of failing in their duty to promote ratification of the Treaty in a second 
                                             
47 See Irish Times 8th May 2002.  The two headlines on the launch were ‘SF plans higher taxes 
for rich and businesses’ and ‘Party lays out surprisingly detailed left-wing vision’.  
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 referendum and attacked Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy for his public rows 
with the EU Commission on the question of Irish budgetary and taxation policy.  
Labour raised the reform of CAP as part of their agriculture policy document but 
in the context of benefiting small over large farmers rather than overall EU level 
reform.  Apart from this their interventions were limited to a statement from MEP 
Prionsíos de Rossa saying ‘Ireland must be at the heart of Europe’ re-iterating 
the positions set out in their manifesto but not directly engaging with the positions 
of the other parties.48
 
Sinn Féin and the Greens clearly wished to engage in a debate on the EU.  They 
both raised it at their campaign launches, issued press releases on Nice and 
mentioned in on most of their election leaflets.  However with the effective refusal 
of the pro-Nice parties to join in the debate and given the nature of TV and media 
coverage discussed below they failed to make much impact in the media on this 
issue, though voters could hardly have been unaware of their positions.  It is not 
possible to say to what extent opposition to the Nice Treaty and the profile they 
gained in the earlier referendum contributed to the relative success of the Greens 
and Sinn Féin in the election.  The tiny Socialist Party who opposed Nice 
retained their sitting TD and some independent candidates such as Finian 
McGrath in Dublin North Central, who though elected primarily as local activists, 
had campaigned very publicly in their own constituencies for a no vote in the 
Nice referendum, also did well.49
 
There was some other media coverage of foreign policy issues during the 
campaign that did not relate directly to the election.  Most parties issued 
statements on the Middle East for example.  However the releases/speeches 
were statements of principle which did not attack or engage with other Irish 
political parties.  They probably would have been issued whether there was an 
election on at that time or not and were only tangentially part of the election 
campaign.50  
 
One feature of the foreign policy aspects of the election campaign was the 
absence of any significant NGO lobbying or interventions.  The activity of Irish 
based NGOs with a foreign policy focus in lobbying generally, in particular with 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Oireachtas Committee on Foreign 
Affairs has been documented.51  Yet during the heightened political activity of the 
election across a range of NGOs there was no concerted effort to secure policy 
                                             
48 Issued 30 April 2002, see www.labour.ie
49 McGrath, though elected primarily as an independent community candidate had a strong track 
record of involvement in nationalist and human right campaigns related to Northern Ireland, such 
as the campaign or the release of the ‘Birmingham Six’ and in support of nationalist communities 
opposing controversial Orange Order marches. 
50 e.g.   Michael D Higgins on ‘Israel’s military campaign in the Occupied Territories’, 14th April 
2002 (Labour website).  Brian Cowen supporting a UN inquiry into events in Jenin, 19th April, Irish 
Times 20th April 2002. 
51 e.g.  Ben Tonra ‘Irish Foreign Policy’ in William Crotty and David E. Schmitt (eds.) Ireland on 
the World Stage (Harlow, 2002), 24-45.   
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 commitments from the political parties or highlight issues of concern52.  There 
was no previous study to compare level of NGO activity in other elections but 
anecdotal evidence from party activists suggests that there was a lower level of 
NGO lobbying in 2002.  It is possible that the increased engagement between 
NGO’s, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Oireachtas Committee has 
drawn lobby groups into a more a structured relationship with the policy process 
so that they no long give the same priority to enlisting public support during 
election campaigns.   
 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
In the media analysis that followed the election a view was widely expressed that 
the election campaign had been largely devoid of content and debate.53  This 
was perceived to be in stark contrast to the election results, where the 
comparatively strong showing of Sinn Féin, the Greens and the independents, 
coupled with the substantial loss of seats by Fine Gael, indicated that something 
was going on among the electorate that had not been visible in the media 
coverage of the campaign.54  The blame for this failure to identify and discuss 
what was motivating the electorate focused on the overcautious stage-managed 
campaigns of the major parties and the acquiescence of the media to the agenda 
set by party strategists and pollsters.  The media coverage acted like a piecrust, 
obscuring and containing the interesting shifts in opinion and voting intention that 
were taking place across the country. 
 
The dominance of television coverage in the media campaign has meant that not 
only is it the public’s primary source of information but that it also sets the tone 
for coverage in other media. RTE rigidly allocated TV time in proportion to the 
percentage support received at the previous election.  This decision ignored the 
substantial fall in Fine Gael support – tracked in opinion polls over a lengthy 
period and the rise in support for Sinn Féin and the Greens. It also meant that 
independent candidates and the outgoing Socialist Party TD who could have 
contributed to the debate were effectively excluded. The television coverage 
followed a particular format, relying heavily on coverage of party leaders 
canvassing, opinion polls and debates on economic statistics.  The style of TV 
“analysis” was also overwhelmingly adversarial rather than investigative, in that it 
chose to high light arguments between the parties rather that instigate discussion 
on party policy from an independent perspective.  Therefore in most cases 
debate on policy issues only took place where the main parties decided they 
wanted to engage on the issue.  Since the pro Nice parties saw no advantage to 
them in campaigning actively on the Treaty – there was no debate on the issues 
involved in the ratification of the treaty in the campaign.   
 
                                             
52 Eilís Ní Leathlobhair  , The Political Engagement of NGOs in Ireland during the 2002 election  
unpublished MA thesis, Dublin City University 2002. 
53 e.g. Terry Prone, Irish Times, May 16 2002. 
54 Harry Browne, Irish Times, May 25 2002. 
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 Obviously foreign policy is not the only issue which was lost from the campaign 
because of this type of coverage.  Issues higher on the public’s political agenda 
such as health policy were only discussed at a superficial level.  The key point 
from the foreign policy perspective is that the expected low level of foreign policy 
engagement was further depressed by the particular characteristics of the 2002 
campaign.  In spite of significant differences between the parties and the 
expectation that voters would, at least at the margins, be motivated by those 
issues of difference, the main political parties for tactical reasons and with the 
acquiescence of the media were able to successfully prevent debate.   An 
argument could be made that the key issues of difference between the parties - 
Northern Ireland, the Nice Treaty, neutrality and engagement in peace keeping  - 
if debated would have been more likely to gain publicity and enhance the 
electoral performance of the smaller parties.  In addition to this tactical reason for 
avoiding debate, the main parties also wished to avoid issues that would 
disadvantage them vis a vis each other.  The actual outcome of the election 
however leaves open the question of the role that foreign policy plays in the 
construction of party image and the attraction and retention of voters. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this study are in line with previous assessments of the role of 
foreign policy in general elections in that the debate on foreign policy issues was 
absent from the campaign, and it is not on this basis possible to assign any 
significance to inter party policy differences on these issues to the outcome of the 
election.  But it does not necessarily follow from this that in fact foreign policy 
positions do not have any impact on party support.   There is a case to be made 
that in 1987 and again in 1997 policy differences on Northern Ireland between 
Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had a marginal but significant impact on the final 
election result.  Certainly in the 2002 election the strategies of the parties would 
indict that they believed foreign policy issues could have an impact on their 
support even if it was a marginal one.  This point is made by inference – Fianna 
Fáil assumed its Northern Ireland policy was an electoral advantage by the 
prominence it was given in publicity material and Fine Gael by their avoidance of 
the topic evidently thought so too.  All the pro-Nice Treaty parties implicitly 
recognised the electoral danger of engaging in debate on this topic and therefore 
avoided it.   
 
Aldrich et. al. looking at US presidential elections examined the apparent 
contradiction between the amount of time and effort devoted to foreign policy by 
candidates and the prevailing scholarly opinion that voters have little information 
and weak interest on these issues and therefore they do not impact on voting 
behaviour.55  They conclude that voters do have opinions on these issues and do 
                                             
55 John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan and Eugene Borgida, ‘Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do 
Presidential Candidates “Waltz Before a Blind Audience?”, American Political Science Review 83 
(1) (1989), 123-42. 
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 appreciate party difference and that if the candidates seek to do so they can 
activate voters on foreign policy.  In the Irish case, because the main parties 
avoided any foreign policy debate (with the exception of Fianna Fáil on Northern 
Ireland) does not mean that voters do not understand party differences on foreign 
policy or that the possibility of motivating voters on this issue is non-existent.  At 
present the role of the foreign policy profiles of the Green Party, Sinn Féin and 
some of the independents in their election success is an unknown quantity.  
Given they now form a significant minority in the Dáil and there are some 
interesting foreign policy debates ahead it may mean that foreign policy debates 
could be more significant in the next election. 
 19
